Visual Cognition Group

Research center

45 rue d’Ulm
75230 Paris
Marc Mézard


Ecole Normale Supérieure
Université Pierre et Marie Curie


Laboratoire de Neurosciences Cognitives
Institut d'Etudes Cognitives


human visual system
brain-body interactions


Park HD, Tallon-Baudry C. The neural subjective frame: from bodily signals to perceptual consciousness. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci. 2014 Mar 17;369(1641):20130208. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2013.0208. Print 2014 May 5.

Sergent C., Wyart V., Babo-Rebelo M., Naccache L., Cohen L., Tallon-Baudry C. (2013) Cueing attention after the stimulus is gone can retrospectively trigger conscious perception. Current Biology 23, 150-155.

Rastelli, F., Tallon-Baudry, C., Migliaccio, R., Toba, M.N., Ducorps, A., Pradat-Diehl, P., Duret, C., Dubois, B., Valero-Cabre, A., and Bartolomeo, P. (2013) Neural dynamics of neglected targets in patients with right hemisphere damage, Cortex, 49(7), 1989-1996.

Campana, F. and Tallon-Baudry, C. (2013) Anchoring visual subjective experience in a neural model: The coarse vividness hypothesis. Neuropsychologia, 51(6), 1050-1060.

Chanes, L., Quentin, R., Tallon-Baudry, C., and Valero-Cabre, R. (2013) Causal frequency-specific contributions of frontal spatiotemporal patterns induced by non-invasive neurostimulation to human visual performance (2013), Journal of Neuroscience, 33, 5000-5005.

Gamond L, Tallon-Baudry C, Guyon N, Lemaréchal JD, Hugueville L, George N. (2012) Behavioral evidence for differences in social and non-social category learning. Frontiers in Psychology 3:291.

Fields of research

Cognitive neurosciences / neuropsychology /neuroeconomy

Research Theme

The articulation between cognition and consciousness

We use MEG and behavior to understand how the neural processes performing perceptual (ie, figure/ground) or cognitive (ie, attentional selection) are articulated with those giving rise to visual subjective experience.

How brain-body loops may participate to the emergence of consciousness

Consciously perceiving a visual stimulus requires taking a first-person perspective and therefore some minimal concept of the self, that could be based on the neural representation of the internal state of the body and central modulation of homeostatic regulations. We experimentally test the hypothesis that episodes of visual awareness and episodes of unawareness are associated with different states of brain-body interactions.